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Abstract
This study intends to provide a theoretical ground
that conceptualizes the prospect of detecting insider
threats based on leader-member exchange. This
framework
specifically
corresponds
to
two
propositions raised by Ho, Kaarst-Brown et al. [42].
Team members that are geographically co-located or
dispersed are analogized as human sensors in social
networks with the ability to collectively “react” to
deception, even when the act of deception itself is not
obvious to any one member. Close interactive
relationships are the key to afford a network of human
sensors an opportunity to formulate baseline
knowledge of a deceptive insider. The research
hypothesizes that groups unknowingly impacted by a
deceptive leader are likely to use certain languageaction cues when interacting with each other after a
leader violates group trust.
Keywords: computer-mediated deception, human
computer interaction, insider threat, language-action
cues, leader member exchange

1. Introduction
Insider threat has been a complex and prolonged
problem in the history of governments. Early
espionage cases such as CIA agent Aldrich Ames and
FBI agent Robert Hanssen provide examples of
insiders that successfully deceived their colleagues.
Both betrayed their organizations to sell national
intelligence for personal profit, demonstrating the
prolonged investigative challenges presented by a
deceptive insider [1]. Studies have resulted in
significant findings on illicit cyber activities within
government sectors, as identified by the U.S. Secret
Services and CERT/SEI [48], but insider threat
incidents continue—and may be on the increase. After
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the 911 attacks, information-sharing across the
governments was mandated, and easy access to
information may have paved the way for Edward
Snowden; a junior NSA contractor with elevated
system administrator’s privileges who compromised
and disclosed thousands of classified documents
without authorization in 2013. Soon after, CIA hacking
tools were leaked by intelligence agents and
contractors [72, 73], setting intelligence operations
back many years. While digital innovation works to
improve the public sector’s ability to deliver value, and
e-Government venues allow for novel systems
capabilities and collaborative resources, the problem of
insider threats increases by allowing the deceptive
insider easy access to information (i.e., supported by
the cloud computing services). The benefits of this
innovation cannot be ignored, but the threat presented
by rogue and deceptive insiders must also be
addressed. Traditional case analysis approaches (e.g.,
[1, 48, 65]) do not allow for early threat identification
of computer-mediated deception. New theoretical
frameworks for understanding potential deceptive
insider are urgently needed to balance the need for
information sharing against the dangers of deceptive
insiders accessing secrets and national intelligence
within the government.
The pervasive adoption of computer-mediated
technologies has created new opportunities for
communication and online self-expression, enabling
collaboration that transcends our physical space.
However, computer-mediated technologies also present
challenges in the establishment and maintenance of
trusting relationships among members in virtual teams.
Trust, irrespective of communication mode (computermediated or face-to-face), can be easily undermined by
an act of deception [10, 11]. Ironically, when one
communicating partner attempts to deceive another,
s/he often will leverage the trust that has already been
established with that partner to conceal the deception.
When one group member attempts to deceive an entire
group, particularly in a virtual team context, the
deception unwittingly affects every interacting member
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of the group, and can negatively impact the
effectiveness of group communication as well as
functional efficiency and operations.
Identifying deception has been explored in a wide
range of facets and contexts. For example, Ekman and
Friesen [18], [19] suggested deception leakage through
facial expression and body gesture. Deception occurs
frequently from everyday white lies [13, 67], to serious
lies [16]. Verbal [15, 75], nonverbal [7, 8, 14, 83-85],
and text-based [81] cues in deceivers’ interpersonal
communication have been effective clues for deception
detection. Research on deception strategies [5, 6, 79],
beneficiary [78], perceived credibility [24, 25], as well
as cultural influences and media choice [23, 49] have
collectively informed our understanding of “how” and
“why” people deceive. Physiological and behavioral
reactions, cognitive effort and stress can serve as
indicators of deception [17, 59]. Moreover, automated
credibility screening and assessment systems have
been designed to evaluate the frequency of exposure to
highly concealed information [20, 69, 70], and to
conduct automated interviews that can detect deception
[71] in face-to-face (FtF) settings. As rich as this
deception research is, it has largely focused on the
context of interpersonal communication. Several
research efforts have been exploring the group’s ability
to detect deception in virtual teams settings. Marett and
George [54], for example, suggested that interaction,
diverse knowledgebase and distinct perspectives in a
group will positively influence the deception detection.
Moreover, a deceiver will typically strategize to
establish credibility by presenting truthful information
at first, followed by false information. Marett and
George [55] later explored the motivation,
characteristics and intrinsic factors of deceivers in
relations with the group members, and found support
for the idea that deceivers devise strategies to confuse
with false information, and that groups in this situation
detect deception better when they are collocated.
Giordano and George [27] further suggested the
correlation of task complexity with a group’s ability to
detect deception. That is, groups performing lowcomplexity tasks can detect deception better than
groups performing high-complexity tasks. Groups with
baseline knowledge of each other can detect deception
better than groups without baseline knowledge of each
other. These studies suggest that the more familiar and
experienced the deceiver is with the group, the less
likely the deceiver will succeed in deception. Because
the impact of leader deception [31] in group-level
communication can be significant, and could result in
loss of organizational commitment, reputation or
revenue, the present study furthers this inquiry by
bolstering literature in leader deception within a group

context, with specific reference to the impact exhibited
by group dynamics when a leader becomes deceptive.
Unfortunately, effectively detecting insider threat
presents great challenges. First, an insider’s deception
generally occurs subtly, and there are rarely detectable
early warning signs. Second, detection of insider’s
deception requires acute observation and discernment.
Inaccurate observations generate false positive alarms,
and create a low trust atmosphere in the workplace.
Third, although an insider refers to anyone in the
organization, the present study specifically defines that
an insider could be any individual with authorized
access to information, that once betrayed, could inflict
significant damage (e.g., reputational, or financial loss)
against his or her own organization [42]. In this study,
the term “leader” is metaphorically adopted to refer to
those individuals who control critical information
resources and whose access to certain essential
information is granted. Thus, the leader’s deception
becomes the focus of this theoretical inquiry. Based on
the above challenges, this study adopts a new
theoretical framework that aims to review and evaluate
the communications between a deceptive insider and
group dynamics, while proposing to explore group
dynamics objectively, rather than through group
members’ subjective cognitive perceptions as collected
by
survey
instruments.
More
specifically,
communication logs of virtual teams that include a
deceptive leader are compared to those of control
groups that do not. Moreover, the groups’ collective
reactions before and after a leader becomes deceptive
are also hypothesized as being capable of indicating a
possible insider threat occurrence.
This paper discusses an inquiry into the influences
of deceptive leaders’ behaviors on the collective
perspectives of virtual teams, and intends to address
the research question: How is communication in a
virtual team collectively impacted to reflect the
presence of a deceptive leader? To answer this
question, leader-member exchange (LMX) and
deception literature are reviewed and discussed. Ho,
Kaarst-Brown et al. [42] boldly postulated that
“humans as smart sensors can understand and interpret
subtle communication signals associated with reduced
trustworthiness” (p. 276). Based on this proposition,
the present study framework further develops the
rationale for observing patterns of language-action
cues in a virtual group’s interactive communication
behavior that can collectively “react” and change after
a leader has taken covert actions to deceive.

2. Group Trust in Leader Member
Exchange
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Trust influences and impacts interpersonal
relationships, as well as the relationships within,
between, and among groups [45]. In a group context,
trust is essentially necessitated by the interdependence
of the group members. Each member of the group is
expected to fulfill a designated role and perform
certain responsibilities that contribute to the group’s
collective goal(s). As such, each member’s ability to
perform their own tasks to some extent depends upon
others also performing their respective designated
responsibilities. Group trust depends on the interaction
and relationships between leaders and their group
members. Team leaders play an essential role in
establishing and maintaining trust among members of a
team, and members develop exchange relationships
with their leaders [76]. Group trust can be influenced
by a leader’s behavior and leadership style. Dansereau,
Graen et al. [12], Liden and Graen [50] and many
colleagues proposed the dyadic exchange between
leader and subordinates concerning organizational
behavior. Liden, Wayne et al. [51] suggested that
leaders tend to develop different leadership styles,
relationships or exchange with different subordinates.
Moreover, Bauer, Green et al. [2] suggested that
“leader-member exchange is intertwined with the
concept of mutual trust” (p. 1541). The importance of
the interaction between the leader and members was
emphasized, especially when building group trust [26,
52]. Different leadership styles engender different
group communication patterns and performance
outcomes [53]. On the other hand, members of a group
can also develop different types of social exchange
relationships both with other group members as well as
with their immediate supervisors. As leaders represent
organizational support, LMX social exchange can
influence and mediate members’ perception of the
overall organizational support [76]. The differences in
leader-member exchanges within a group will impact
the group members’ work attitudes, as well as
coworkers’ relationships with each other. Erdogan and
Bauer [22] noted that while low-quality leader/
member exchanges typically put less favored
employees/ members at a disadvantage in terms of
resource distribution and promotion; high-quality
leader/member exchanges often result in faster
advancement and productivity for a favored employee/
member. LMX differentiation is the extent to which a
leader’s behavior affects (encourages or undermines)
group trust and performance outcomes [35, 53]. That
is, perceived injustices by a group leader against
certain group members can negatively affect the
attitudes, interactions, sense of loyalty and
commitment of all group members [21, 22]. Moreover,
group members may withdraw (i.e., reduce

interactivity/ participation) when they perceive an
imbalance in fairness or justice.
One’s trust towards an individual can be impacted
(i.e., reduced or lost) as a result of the violation of
competence in the performance of obligations, or the
violation of integrity [42]. Competence-based trust
violations occur when group members feel betrayed
because a member does not fulfill obligations or
expectations. This breach of trust occurs as a result of
“incongruence” [57] arising from a violation against
the reciprocal exchanged agreements (often referred to
as a “psychological contract”) by and among group
members [63, 66]. Integrity-based trust violations, on
the other hand, occur when a member behaves against
the interests of the group in an illegal or unethical
manner [36, 40, 42]. This violation of integrity-based
trust, often triggered by a leader’s ethical dilemma,
constitutes an act of deception [40]. When this leader
violates group trust, not only does the violation
significantly impact the functions and effectiveness of
a group, but his/her intimate knowledge of the group’s
activities and privileged access to relevant information
may also jeopardize intellectual property and
information assets. Jones and Marsh [46] stated that in
some cases, the cause(s) of a loss of group trust may be
superficial and relatively minor (e.g., personality
clashes between individual group members), having
only a small overall impact on group efficacy.
However, the loss of group trust can also result in the
loss of a leader’s credibility within the group, which
can further impact his/her leadership [c.f., 66]. The
group’s perception of the leader’s credibility is a
primary source of influence leveraged by the leader to
manage the group and its members. George, Giordano
et al.
[25]
pointed
out
that
credibility
assessments/perceptions can change over time.
Individuals with higher perceived credibility are more
likely to be trusted than those with lower credibility
[c.f., 24]. In turn, loss of credibility within the group
can trigger suspicion and motivate other members to
detect deception. That is, those group members are apt
to be more sensitive toward the leader’s behavior vis-àvis group interaction. Motivation as one of the
antecedents can be essential in successful deception
detection. The more motivated members are to
identifying deception, the easier it is to find a
communicator that is not creditable; however, the
number of false alarms accompany the detection may
also increase [24].
When the leader breaches a psychological contract
by deceiving (or attempting to deceive) fellow
members of a group, the dynamics of deception in
group communication becomes more complex than
deception in one-on-one interpersonal communication.
The deceptive leader’s persuasive strategy must
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account for multiple, interactive perspectives, which
often requires a deceiver to leverage and combine
cognitive and affective processes. That is, regardless of
whether trust within a group is built on cognitive
factors, affective factors or a combination, when trust
is observed as being violated by a deceptive leader,
subordinates’ perception and commitment to the
organization may be negatively influenced [31].
Furthermore, the group’s collective view and
assessment of the deceptive leader’s behavior will be
impacted, and overall group trust may be undermined.
This, in turn, results in less effective group
interactions, and ultimately (negatively) affects the
group’s overall performance.

move” aspect of deception. Vrij [74] referred to
deception as an intentional and volitional act. It would
be an act of deception to convey a message knowing it
to be false. However, it would not be an act of
deception to convey a false message while believing it
to be true [74, p. 5]. Gneezy [28] suggested that
deception is often motivated by self-interest, and just
as often results in an outcome that is detrimental to the
other party(ies) involved. Deception occurs not only in
face-to-face interactions, but also frequently occurs
within computer-mediated communication (i.e., e-mail,
instant-message, or group chat).

3. Close Relationships

Computer-mediated
communication
enables
information to be transferred to a message receiver
through words and a pattern of communication cues.
These cues can reveal both the overt and covert intent
of a message sender. However, in this cue-lean
environment, the availability of such cues is effectively
limited to the text itself without the physical cues in
FtF communication. Nonetheless, even in ‘cue lean’
text-based communication, there can be linguistic and
syntactical cues of deception. For example, Newman,
Pennebaker et al. [58] suggested that the overuse of
sensory or spatiotemporal words, and changes in the
diversity and complexity of language have been shown
to be suggestive of deception. Zhou, Burgoon et al.
[80] noted that deceivers tend to be more casual and
expressive in their linguistic style. Level of detail (too
much or too little) may also be indicative of deception
in both FtF and CMC communication. Deceivers in
CMC particularly tend to be wordier than truth-tellers,
but the additional words (i.e., detail) provided are not
necessarily relevant or meaningful in context [82]. Not
only so, Hancock, Curry et al. [33] discovered that
deceivers tend to use more sense-based words (e.g.,
seeing, touching), few self-oriented but more otheroriented pronouns in text-based CMC. Enabled with
multiple cues and immediate feedbacks, richer media
can increase the ability of message receivers to
perceive and thus facilitate the deception detection
[47]. However, simply knowing these linguistic cues
does not help conversational partners to improve
deception detection. Hancock, Birnholtz et al. [34]
suggested that certain language-action cues (e.g., firstperson references, words of emotion or inhibition, etc.)
have been shown to be effective indicators to
differentiate deceivers from truth tellers. While, in
general, humans are poor at detecting deception, Ho,
Hancock et al. [39] computationally identified
deceivers’ strategies through the use of salient
language-action cues, which include the use of words
associated with affective processes, cognitive

Close relationships and interaction within the group
allows an opportunity for group members to construct
baseline expectations and build trust with each other
[43, 44, 62]. As group size and task characteristics
would necessitate differences in ways people interact
in groups, Hackman and Vidmar [32] empirically
proved that optimal satisfaction is found with groups
having four to five members (pp. 48-49). Wheelan [77]
also confirmed that groups containing 3 to 6 members
were significantly more productive and developmental
than larger groups. The present study thus suggests
designing experiments to facilitate small group
situations where members are given opportunities to
interact closely [41], which also follows the
proposition postulated by Ho, Kaarst-Brown et al. [42]
that “close relationships” are required to afford groups
the opportunities to unknowingly observe subtle
language-action cues that may indicate a lowering of
trustworthiness (p. 276).
Highly controlled and structured research design
can allow researchers to collect a large dataset of
parsed language-action cues as repeated measures,
which represent the objective perspectives of virtual
teams’ interaction.

4. Language-Action Cues in Deception
Ekman and Friesen [18] characterized deception as
the purposeful concealment of the truth, either by
omission or commission. Deception typically involves
a persuasive, strategic process by which a deceiver
transmits messages that have been deliberately
distorted and/or manipulated, with the intention of
misleading or misdirecting a receiver into reaching a
wrong conclusion, or otherwise fostering a false belief,
often for the deceiver’s own benefit [6]. Buller and
Burgoon [6] proposed Interpersonal Deception Theory
(IDT), which explores the chess-like “move/counter-

4.1. Language-Action Cues
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processes, self- and other- references, as well as the use
of peripheral expressions and overall wordiness.
The importance of immediacy cues and the
representation of these cues illustrate psychological
elements of communication [7-9]. A message sender
may employ cues to associate (or distance) him/herself
physically or psychologically from the content of a
message [56, p. 203]. Buller and Burgoon [5] noted
that deceivers often use both verbal and nonverbal
means to “distance [him/herself] from others, to
disaffiliate, and to close off scrutiny or probing
communication” (p. 204). These include cues of (1)
uncertainty and vagueness, (2) nonimmediacy,
reticence, and withdrawal, (3) disassociation, and (4)
image- and relationship-protecting behavior [5, p.204].
Similarly, social distance theorists [c.f., 13] suggested
that a deceptive actor will try to minimize potential
cues to minimize the cognitive load associated with
deception, by adopting a cue-lean communication
mode or style and thereby limiting opportunities for
others to question or engage him/her in conversation.
In FtF communication, a deceiver can create
psychological distance by exhibiting literal (physical)
distance (e.g., standing/ sitting remotely from the
conversational party), or perhaps by choosing to
interact via the telephone rather than meeting in
physical
space
[56].
Likewise,
in
CMC
communication, psychological distance can be created
through word choice and phraseology—that is,
minimizing immediacy [5]. Word choice and overall
tone that suggest negative feelings (such as
disappointment, frustration, or even anger) may be a
sign of distancing, while word choice and tone
suggesting a positive relationship—perhaps conveying
humor or praise—can foster a positive, trusting
relationship between communicating actors.

4.2. Deceptive Leader’s Language-Action Cues
Several studies have been conducted to illustrate
how a deceptive insider’s behavior can be uncovered.
Schultz [64], for example, speculated on a set of
behavioral cues that can be used to predict deceptive
insider attacks, including deliberate markers,
meaningful errors, preparatory behavior, correlated use
patterns, verbal behavior, and personality traits.
Greitzer, Kangas et al. [29], [30] attempted to create a
behavioral/ psychological model that can identify
deceptive insiders with a view towards preemptive
intervention. The focus in these models involves
categorizing
and
modeling
behaviors
and
psycholinguistic cues [3, 4, 68]. Brown, Watkins et al.
[4] focused on linguistics—specifically, translating
observed linguistic cues into behavioral categories
identified as corresponding to behaviors significantly

associated with deceptive insiders. Ho, Hancock et al.
[40] further the investigation by setting up insider
threat experiments with the complexity of objectives
and tasks as controlled variables, and identifying that
deceptive leaders can successfully conceal their
deceptive intent in leader-member exchange. In other
words, no statistical significant differences were found
in deceptive leaders’ language-action cues after they
were influenced to betray. No statistical significant
differences were found in a deceptive leader’s
language-action cues when compared with those of
non-deceptive leaders. However, these findings only
examine CMC deception from the perspective of the
leaders’ communication.

4.3. Language-Action Cues in Group Dynamics
Taylor, Dando et al. [68] on the other hand
examined the use of language-action cues (specifically,
personal pronouns, as well as words conveying
negative emotions and cognitive processes) in the
context of deception through (asynchronous) e-mail
exchanges, within and between teams in a common
physical location. An insider threat experiment was
conducted in which 25% of the participants were
incentivized to “act” (i.e., pretend) to be deceptive
insiders. Their study discovered that insiders who were
told to pass information—without authorization—to a
provocateur seemed to be more self-focused, and used
more linguistic features associated with negative
emotion and cognitive processes than non-deceptive
insiders in the same group. Specifically, Taylor, Dando
et al.’s [68] findings indicate that the deceptive insiders
used more personal pronouns than others in their
group. Additionally, Taylor, Dando et al. [68] found
that the designated deceivers also used more words
associated with cognitive processes (particularly
discrepancy and tentative).

5. Hypotheses Development
Previous studies suggest that although no statistical
significance was found when comparing a deceptive
leader’s language-action cues with those of nondeceptive leaders, and when comparing a deceptive
leader’s language-action cues after they are
incentivized to betray, it is possible to learn insights
about the deceptive leaders from the interaction, as
well as the reaction of the group members. That is, the
language-action cues including wordiness and
expressiveness (i.e., overall word count), as well as
cognitive processes (i.e., words associated with insight,
causation, discrepancy, certainty, inclusivity and
exclusivity) and affective processes (i.e., words
associated with positive and negative emotion) [60, 61]
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can be indicative of deceptive insider’s intent from the
perspective of the group dynamics. Building on these
research insights, the current study hypothesizes on
each of these cue-types, and presents three sets of
hypotheses with respect to each.

5.1. Expressiveness and Wordiness
First, we consider overall word counts of the
communication within groups that include a deceptive
leader, and expect to observe the leader’s deception
through wordiness and expressiveness that stimulates
group communication. Ho, Hancock et al. [38], [40]
suggested that group members will often sense this,
resulting in more conversations as a whole. Thus, we
attempt to aggregate and parse out word counts of all
group members (including the deceptive leader), and
we hypothesize that groups including deceptive leaders
will likewise exhibit a higher overall word count than
groups without a deceptive leader. That is, we would
expect the overall word count of the groups that
include deceptive leaders to be higher, because a
deceptive leader stimulates more expression and words
overall. Second, we would expect that the overall word
counts of groups that include a deceptive leader will
increase after the leader acts with deceptive intent. In
this hypothesis, the deceptive leader is influenced to
betray the organization for personal gain, rather than
merely acting (i.e., pretending) to betray. Thus, the
groups’ overall word counts are hypothesized to
increase after the betrayal influence in a natural setting.
Accordingly, the following hypotheses are proposed:
H1(a). Communication within groups that include a
deceptive leader (treatment groups) will display
more words overall than communication within
groups consisting only of non-deceptive leaders
(control groups) in a synchronous CMC group
environment.
H1(b). Groups that include a deceptive leader will
display an increase of total word count after this
leader has initiated a process of deception.

5.2. Cognitive Process
As the most prominent insider threat cases are often
committed by those who are in power positions and
betray inherent trust [37, 38], we note that certain
influences can be found in the deceptive leader’s
exchange with the subordinates, and further impact the
subordinates commitment to the organization [31].
Griffith, Connelly et al. [31] validated the deceptive
leader’s influences on leader-member exchange using
survey instruments, while Ho, Hancock et al. [37, 38]

simulated experiments to investigate the differences in
language-action cues between deceptive leaders and
non-deceptive leaders in group interaction, and
specifically how language-action cues from groups that
include a deceptive leader differed from those of
groups that did not include a deceptive leader.
Ho, Hancock et al.’s [37, 38] findings are
consistent with Taylor, Dando et al.’s [68] findings,
suggesting that, in both asynchronous and synchronous
communication, deceptive leaders can be expected to
use more words associated with cognitive processes in
their communication than other members from the
same group. In a different set of hypotheses, Ho,
Hancock et al. [40] further identified differences in
language-action cues—not only between deceptive
leaders and non-deceptive leaders—but also between
groups with a deceptive leader and groups without one.
Ho, Hancock et al. [40] acknowledged that the cues to
a leader’s deceptive behavior tend to be subtle, and
may be hidden or even unnoticeable. The results also
support the proposition that a statistically significant
difference can be found in language-action cues
between groups with a deceptive leader and groups
without one. Our present study, thus, takes a further
step to examine the group’s collective use of words
associated with cognitive processes i.e., words
connoting inclusion, exclusion, certainty and insight,
and how these types of language-action cues are
manifested in patterns of group communication.
As a deceptive leader will influence the LMX [31],
the study further posits that, as a result of a deceptive
leader distancing him-/ herself from other team
members, the group as a whole will sense a change—
specifically, a difference in the leader’s communication
(e.g., use of more cue-lean communication modes, and
distancing behaviors) [40]. As the deceptive leader
attempts to disguise his/her deceptive intent, groups
may collectively interact with the deceptive leader in
ways that display less cognitive process (i.e., certainty,
inclusion, suggestions, or insight). Accordingly, the
following two hypotheses are proposed:
H2(a). Communication within groups that include a
deceptive leader (treatment groups) will display
fewer words relating to cognitive process than
communication within groups consisting of only
non-deceptive leaders (control groups) in a
synchronous CMC group environment.
H2(b). Groups that include a deceptive leader will
display an increase of cognitive process after this
leader has initiated a process of deception.

5.3. Affective Process
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Moreover, as a deceptive leader will influence
LMX [31], the study further proposes that a deceptive
leader’s changed behavior can influence and infect an
associated group with negative emotions. While the
changed behavior of a deceptive leader may initially
prompt analytical discussion amongst team members
(i.e., the use of cognitive-process words reflecting
uncertainty, discrepancy, insight, causation, question,
etc.), the interaction within groups having a deceptive
leader will quickly reflect affective processing (e.g.,
confusion, concern, emotion, frustration, or even
apathy) [40]. Thus, the group’s collective use of words
after deception has been initiated could have been
more associated with affective processes, and the study
suggests that groups including a deceptive leader are
likely to show more emotion (i.e., affect) in their
discussions, using more words reflecting affective
processes (i.e., confusion, concern, frustration, or even
apathy). Accordingly, the study proposes the following
hypotheses on these cues in group dynamics:
H3(a). Communication within groups that include a
deceptive leader (treatment groups) will display
more words of affect than communication within
groups consisting only of non-deceptive leaders
(control groups) in a synchronous CMC group
environment.
H3(b). Groups that include a deceptive leader will
display an increase of affect after this leader has
initiated a process of deception.

6. Recommendations and Future Work
This proposed framework can be empirically tested
through simulating insider threat scenario-based
experiments [42]. Data of group interaction can be
collected to provide insight by comparing groups with
vs. without incentives used to lure individuals to betray
or to deceive the members of the same group.
Experiments can also be set up to compare groups
whose individuals are lured, but do not accept the
incentive.
Future analysis should focus on how group
members collectively react and respond in situations
where a leader becomes deceptive (i.e., “active” versus
“passive” deception), not on the activities carried out
during the deception. Future research may benefit from
a revised design that manipulates this variable by
offering different incentives for active versus passive
deception.

7. Conclusion and Contributions

Insider threat detection and analysis involve
multiple factors, and a better understanding of the
leader’s trustworthiness dynamic in context. The
framework illustrated in this paper supports the two
propositions raised by Ho, Kaarst-Brown et al. [42]
that group members work as smart sensors in close
relationships to objectively reflect in their
communication the subtle changes of the deceptive
insider’s reduced trustworthiness (p. 276). This
framework provides a base for insider threat detection
through understanding of the group dynamics.
Trust is essential for any group and organization to
function. When a team leader violates trust, the
leader’s deceptive behavior can influence the group’s
communication and performance. Moreover, the
collective language-action cues can be observed and
collected as repeated measures during group
interaction. To emphasize, the collective languageaction cues can be indicative when deception is
present, and especially when the interaction within a
team provides context for members to unknowingly
become a network of sensors. Deceptive intent can be
identified through the analysis of group interaction,
and the analysis of a multilevel model can be an
effective means in outing a deceptive leader.
Organizations may consider the analysis of group
interaction as one potential way to understand and
identify leader deception.
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